On Saturday, the US launched military action in Iran. In defending the operation, the president declared that the objective was “to defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime.” He then addressed the Iranian public directly: “The hour of your freedom is at hand… When we are finished, take over your government.”

Those words raise a simple but consequential question: Is the United States pursuing regime change?

If so, Americans deserve clarity, because regime change is not a slogan. It is a strategy with enormous costs, risks, and long-term commitments. And history suggests it rarely unfolds as cleanly as political rhetoric implies.

The term “regime change” is being used loosely in public debate, often interchangeably with another concept: decapitation. The two are not the same.

A regime is not just a leader. It is the system of governance itself: the rules, institutions, and power structures that determine how authority is organized, exercised, and transferred. It is the courts, legislatures, security forces, bureaucracies, and ruling coalitions. All of these form the regime.

Regime change, then, means transforming that system. It is not merely replacing a president or supreme leader. It is altering the political order. The Russian Revolution was regime change. The Allied defeat of Nazi Germany was regime change. It requires dismantling one governing structure and building another.

Decapitation, by contrast, is a tactic. It targets the leadership with the aim of disrupting decision-making or coercing change. Remove the head, and perhaps the body falters. But often, it does not. Institutions endure. Elites regroup. Power reconstitutes itself.

Recent US action in Venezuela illustrates the difference. President Nicolás Maduro was removed, yet the governing framework built since Hugo Chávez’s rise to power remains largely intact. That is decapitation, leadership removal without government transformation.

Iran is an entirely different scale of challenge.

Iran is not Panama in 1989, where US forces removed Manuel Noriega while already maintaining a substantial military presence. It is not Haiti or the Dominican Republic in the early twentieth century, when the US imposed long-term occupations. Nor is it Iraq in 2003, though Iraq serves as a warning.

Iran is a nation of roughly 90 million people, with significant military capacity, deep bureaucratic networks, vast territory, oil wealth, and entrenched ideological institutions. Its ruling system has survived war, sanctions, and decades of external pressure. It also maintains relationships with major powers such as Russia and China.

Toppling such a regime would not be a limited strike. It would require dismantling entrenched institutions and managing the aftermath of collapse. It would likely demand ground forces, long-term stabilization, and decades of political reconstruction. Iraq, more than twenty years after the US invasion, remains a sobering example of how difficult that process can be.

So what is the objective in Iran?

The administration’s stated goals appear to be weakening Iran’s military capabilities, degrading its nuclear program, and eliminating its leadership while encouraging internal opposition. That suggests something more ambitious than simple decapitation, but perhaps less than full regime transformation.

The problem is ambiguity. When leaders speak of “freedom” and urge a population to “take over your government,” they imply systemic change. In 1956, the US “promised” intervention if the Hungarians took over their government. Hungarian rose, and the US did not come. The Soviets did. In Iran, the United States has shown no indication that it is prepared for the enormous commitment regime change would require.

Furthermore, candidate Trump criticized the actions taken by Bush, Obama and Biden because they constituted regime change. Even the 2025 National Security Strategy clearly states that The US would not pursue it. Does this mean a change in policy?

If this is not regime change, officials should say so plainly. If it is, the public deserves an honest conversation about the costs. Regime change is not achieved through airstrikes alone. It demands political reconstruction, security guarantees, and long-term presence. It reshapes regions, and often reshapes the intervening power as well.

The question is not whether Iran’s government is repressive or destabilizing. The question is whether the US is prepared for what replacing it would entail.

History suggests that removing a leader is far easier than rebuilding a political order. Before we blur the line between decapitation and regime change, we should be clear about which path we are on, and whether the US is ready to walk it.

Jose E. Mora, PhD, is a former Professor and Chair of Global Affairs of the American University of Phnom Penh in Cambodia. Mora and his wife, Melissa, recently moved to Berea in order to be closer to their four adult children who also live here.